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13 MARCH 1974 TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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13 MARCH 1974
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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

BREZHNEV REMARKS, GROMYKO VISITS ASSERT SOVIET ROLE IN MIDEAST

Gromyko's talks in Cairo and Damascus, overlapping Secretary Kissinger's fourth visit to the area, come against a background of defensive arguments in Soviet media laying claim to a share of the credit for peace moves in the region. Brezhnev, asked in a French media interview on 10 March if--excluding the Gromyko trip--the Soviet Union was withdrawing from the Middle East problem, firmly rejected the idea. That is only a "superficial impression," he said; "we do not stop defending" the Arabs' just demands. PRAVDA two days earlier had disparaged assertions by "bourgeois papers in the West and in Arab capitals" that the Soviet Union was inactive with regard to a settlement and that the key lay in U.S. hands. And an Arabic-language commentary on the 11th asserted that those who circulated allegations that the USSR was stepping aside were really trying to push it aside, or at least to weaken Soviet-Arab cooperation.

The communique on Gromyko's two-part visit to Syria, interrupted by his five-day visit to Egypt, indicated that while Damascus did gain a pledge of continued Soviet military assistance--a pledge not given in Cairo--Moscow failed to win over President al-Asad to any expression of support for the Geneva peace conference. Damascus did go along, as Cairo did, in declaring that the Soviet Union should participate in "all phases and aspects" of a peace settlement.

Gromyko met with al-Asad during both phases of his visit, as well as holding talks with Foreign Minister Khaddam. No speeches were reported during the second half of the visit. When departing on 7 March, Gromyko said, according to TASS, that he was satisfied with the talks, which were "intensive and fruitful," and that the "exchange of views was of a businesslike, constructive character."

BILATERAL RELATIONS

The communique on the "official, friendly" visit* said the sides expressed satisfaction over the development of bilateral relations and evaluated the "exchange of views" on numerous questions as a positive step in developing relations of "friendship and close cooperation." It

* All versions of the communique, Syrian and Soviet alike, misstated the dates of Gromyko's second visit to Damascus as 4-7 March, when, in fact, Gromyko returned to Damascus from Cairo on 5 March.

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affirmed that Moscow's policy aimed at developing friendship and cooperation with Syria in the political, economic and cultural fields and in "giving aid to strengthen Syria's defense capability." It was somewhat less explicit in this respect than the communique following al-Asad's July 1972 visit to Moscow which noted agreement on measures for further strengthening Syria's "military potential, continuing military cooperation between them, and exchanging views and holding consultations in this field."* As for Syria, the current communique expressed that country's appreciation for Soviet support and backing in all fields and stressed the importance of continuing support--an expression of gratitude not forthcoming from Cairo in the Soviet-Egyptian communique.

The communique expressed the determination of both sides to resist all attempts from "any quarter" to subvert Soviet-Syrian friendship or to obstruct the consolidation of their relations. The 1972 communique had used a broader expression in this respect, referring to the friendship and cooperation between socialist countries and Arab states. The communique, as in 1972, referred to the usefulness of periodic contacts at all levels on bilateral relations and international questions. President al-Asad did not renew his 1972 invitation to the Soviet leaders to visit Syria.

ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE Continued Syrian reluctance to commit itself to attendance at the Geneva conference was evident in the absence of any reference to it in the communique. President al-Asad in his major speech on the anniversary of the 8 March revolution referred implicitly to the conference, declaring that Syria would be absent or present "when it should be." He asserted that Syria would accept no decision imposed on it, and refused any bargaining which would endanger its rights. In his anniversary speech, al-Asad reiterated the standard position that Syria accepts Resolution 242 only if it is interpreted to mean full Israeli withdrawal and restoration of Palestinian rights. But Syria's consistent coolness toward the resolution was evident in the absence of any mention of it in the joint communique.

* President al-Asad's July 1972 visit is discussed in the FBIS TRENDS of 12 July 1972, pages 29-33. He paid a "private" visit to Moscow in late September 1972, according to a brief announcement by Damascus radio a few days later. Beirut and Cairo press reports in May 1973 mentioned another "secret" visit by al-Asad to Moscow early that month, but there was no confirmation from Syrian or Soviet media.

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On the matter of disengagement, the Syrian and Soviet sides declared in the communique that any disengagement agreement should constitute a step toward full Israeli withdrawal in accordance with a specified schedule, and should be part of a comprehensive Middle East settlement.* This standard Soviet position was reinforced in subsequent comment including an Arabic-language commentary on the 11th which said that Egyptian-Israeli disengagement should be emulated in the Golan Heights and that these steps should be followed by "other coordinated efforts by all parties" concerned with a settlement. And a Kolesnichenko commentary broadcast in English to North America on the 12th observed that while Secretary Kissinger had worked energetically on "some issues" for a settlement, including disengagement, the USSR felt that separation of forces on the two fronts "is certainly not enough" and that the problem needed to be cleared up altogether.

The communique recorded the sides' conviction that Syria had the right to use "all effective means" to liberate its occupied lands. Variations on this formula have appeared in Soviet comment sporadically since it was first introduced in the Soviet-Egyptian communique on as-Sadat's April 1972 visit to Moscow. Thus the Arabic-language commentary on the 11th, citing the communique on Gromyko's Damascus visit, said that Syria was entitled to "resort to all forces and methods at its disposal" to achieve its aims.

Soviet media have briefly noted the recent clashes on the Golan front and accused the Israelis of artificially whipping up war hysteria. Moscow had earlier taken note of the flurry in Israel over reported Syrian troop concentrations on the Golan front, with a TASS commentary by Losev on the 6th dismissing the reports as "provocations" engineered by Israel to torpedo the forthcoming Syrian-Israeli disengagement talks. Losev also pointed to an "internal political cause" of the "fraud," claiming that the reports of Syrian troop concentrations were designed to justify Dayan's reversal of his refusal to participate in the new cabinet.

The communique noted the USSR's "great appreciation" for the "steadfastness" of the Syrian armed forces and for Arab solidarity during the October war--elements absent from the communique on Gromyko's Cairo talks. And it called for continued Arab solidarity and vigilance against "imperialist" maneuvers aimed at splitting Arab unity--an idea not expressed in the Soviet-Egyptian communique.

* The Soviet-Egyptian communique did not mention a timetable in asserting the same position on disengagement.

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GROMYKO AND PALESTINIANS

The Soviet-Syrian communique mentioned the Palestinians only in the call for guaranteeing their legitimate national rights; there was no repetition of the assertion, in the communique on al-Asad's July 1972 talks in Moscow, of support for the Palestinian resistance movement as a component part of the Arab national liberation movement. Nor did the current communique mention Gromyko's meeting in Damascus with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir 'Arafat, such as had appeared in the Egyptian-Soviet communique on the earlier Gromyko-'Arafat meeting in Cairo. TASS on the 7th reported briefly that they had met in Damascus that day to "continue an exchange of views" on the Middle East situation and questions connected with securing the Palestinians' legitimate rights. The Beirut AN-NAHAR reported on the 8th that 'Arafat had gone to Damascus from Cairo after being informed that Gromyko wanted to meet with him again before returning to Moscow.

In the only other monitored Soviet reference to Gromyko's meetings with 'Arafat, a Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on the 9th noted that in a statement to the Lebanese AL-MUHARRIR 'Arafat commented on his talks with Gromyko. Reporting on this statement, a Cairo Voice of Palestine broadcast on the 9th cited 'Arafat as saying that the USSR recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Moscow has not explicitly acknowledged such recognition, but the Arabic-language broadcast seemed to give indirect confirmation when it went on to note 'Arafat's remark that the PLO was "increasingly receiving international recognition" as the sole legal representative of the Palestinians.

The Beirut AN-NAHAR item, cited above, listed three chief topics of the Gromyko-'Arafat talks in Cairo and Damascus, reporting that Gromyko said Moscow recognized the PLO and was trying to secure U.S. recognition. The paper added that 'Arafat was extended an "official" Soviet Government invitation to visit Moscow rather than the "semiofficial" invitations in the past from the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. AN-NAHAR said that the third main topic discussed was the need for adopting a "specific Palestinian attitude" toward the West Bank and the Gaza Strip--a Palestinian "entity"--and the need for forming a Palestinian government to represent the Palestinians at the Geneva conference.

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MOSCOW MEDIA AMBIVALENT ON CONTINUING ARAB OIL EMBARGO

While TASS and Moscow's domestic service have generally played the oil embargo issue in a straightforward fashion, comment carried on Moscow radio's Arabic-language service and the "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress programs in Arabic has tended to side with those Arab states which oppose lifting the embargo.

TASS on the 7th reported factually but selectively President Nixon's remarks on the subject at his news conference the previous evening. The account cited him as saying that the oil embargo issue could not usefully be discussed at this juncture, and reported that according to the President's information the Arab oil-producing countries' meeting was scheduled for 11 March. TASS did not acknowledge Nixon's statement that this meeting would, he thought, take place in Egypt and that "apparently the Egyptians have some influence on that decision." The account did note his report of progress on the diplomatic front and his statement that this progress would inevitably have a constructive impact on the oil countries' decision on the embargo. The President added, TASS said, that he intended to leave the decision to them, because talk about how they would act could induce them to act otherwise.

A TASS dispatch on the 12th, reporting that the Arab oil ministers were to meet in Tripoli, Libya, the next day, noted that Egypt's proposal a few days earlier to shift the venue to Cairo had not received sufficient support. TASS noted "considerable differences" among the Arab countries on the embargo issue, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia supporting the lifting or easing of the embargo in the belief that the U.S. position with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict had changed. Iraq, Algeria, and Libya, TASS said, were strongly opposed, since in their view there were no marked changes in U.S. policy. A Moscow domestic radio report the day before, however, had cited diplomatic circles as saying that most Arab leaders were "agreed in principle" that the embargo should be lifted, since it had "already played a positive role in creating conditions" for a Middle East settlement.

COMMENT IN ARABIC

A different, contrasting treatment of the oil embargo issue was reflected in Moscow's Arabic-language service, however, on the eve of the Tripoli meeting. This service on the 12th carried a commentary by Soviet oil expert Andreasyan which implicitly sided with the hardliners, remarking that Algeria, Iraq, Syria and Libya were convinced that lifting the embargo would be a "premature award" to the United States, and that some Arab

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circles believed that raising the embargo now would only result in freezing the situation in the Middle East. It was quite clear, Andreasyan said, who would be the primary beneficiary of liquidation of the use of the oil weapon. Earlier, an Arabic-language broadcast on the 9th maintained that the reasons for the oil embargo were still valid, as the major issues of Israeli withdrawal and guarantee of Palestinian rights were still unsettled.

Arabic-language programs of Radio Peace and Progress, which have been carrying veiled criticism of Egyptian President as-Sadat's economic policies, also implicitly attacked his position on the embargo question. A commentary on 7 March declared that if "some Arab leaders" are ready to surrender in the face of U.S. pressure and lift the oil embargo before Arab demands are fulfilled, they are taking a chance in challenging the whole Arab world and "world progressive forces," which insist on continued use of oil as a weapon.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW PLAYS DOWN POMPIDOU VISIT, STRESSES "BUSINESSLIKE" TALKS

Against the background of a cooling in Franco-Soviet relations over the past six months, Moscow has provided little fanfare for the meeting between Brezhnev and Pompidou at Pitsunda on 12-13 March. Aware that the fluid state of EC relations and France's isolation in the Western alliance have severely limited Pompidou's base for diplomatic initiative, Moscow has taken care to avoid raising expectations regarding the meeting. Treating the visit as one in a series of diplomatic exchanges, Moscow has laid the basis for claiming some modest success even if the meeting results in only an exchange of views.

Over the two-week period following an announcement of the Pompidou visit by Moscow radio on 28 February, Soviet comment consisted largely of routine TASS and Moscow radio items. The purpose and anticipated results of the visit were expressed in highly general formulations concerning improvement of Soviet-French relations and strengthening peace in Europe and the world.

Prior to flying to Pitsunda on 10 March, Brezhnev met with a group of French journalists in Moscow. He said he expected his meeting with Pompidou to be "brief" and their talks to be "businesslike and friendly." Stating that no agenda had been drawn up, Brezhnev indicated that Soviet-French relations and the international scene would no doubt be considered.

One item likely to be high on Brezhnev's personal agenda is the French attitude toward West European defense cooperation. Moscow has roundly denounced this concept in recent months, and Brezhnev will almost certainly want to explore what concrete steps France may be contemplating in the realm of European defense. French defense minister Jobert's ambiguous statement in Paris on 11 March that although he wanted U.S. troops to remain in Europe, their maintenance there "is in no way a fundamental matter for us," is certain to fuel Soviet interest.

Another topic, singled out by Brezhnev in his talk with the French correspondents as virtually certain to be discussed, is the course of the European security conference. Moscow has called for a summit meeting to conclude the third and final stage of the conference and would like French concurrence in such an arrangement. A TASS dispatch from Paris on 7 March explicitly suggested this Soviet interest, stating that the USSR and France "could play a great role" in completing the work of the security conference.

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VIETNAM

WOMEN'S ROLE IN REVOLUTION HAILED AT FOURTH VNU CONGRESS

The fourth congress of the Vietnam Women's Union, held from 4 to 7 March, was the last of three nationwide meetings of DRV mass organizations convened this year in the wake of the 22d plenum of the Vietnam Workers Party Central Committee. Following the practice at the recent meetings of the DRV trade union congress and the DRV youth conference,* the women's congress heard a top Politburo member--in this case First Secretary Le Duan--give the opening speech and a ranking union official--vice president of the Vietnam Women's Union Ha Giang--deliver a report reviewing the women's movement since the third congress 13 years ago and outlining the union's tasks in the "new stage." The congress resolution recapitulated the main themes enunciated by the speakers and listed six specific tasks for the Vietnam Women's Union, including motivating women to become involved "in the movement to work, produce, and diligently and thrifitly build socialism."

The congress presidium, as reported by Hanoi radio on 4 March, consisted of Ton Duc Thang, Nguyen Luong Bang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, and Van Tien Dung, who continues to stand in for absent Defense Minister Giap. Hanoi reported that Nguyen Thi Thap, who has been chairman of the women's union since at least 1960, was "unanimously" elected "honorary" chairman of the union and that the newly elected chairman is Ha Thi Que, a former vice chairman.

In addition to the delegation of the Moscow-backed Women's International Democratic Federation, some 30 foreign delegations attended the congress, including representatives from all the socialist countries except China--a pattern set at the trade union congress. Peking's acknowledgment of the congress was limited to a congratulatory message "on behalf of the Chinese women" from the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and a short report after the women's congress concluded. In addition to delegations from France, Sweden, Japan and Finland, the congress drew a heavy sprinkling of women participants from third world countries.

* The meetings of the DRV trade union congress and the DRV youth conference are discussed in the TRENDS of 21 February 1974, pages 20-23, and of 27 February 1974, pages 9-11; respectively.

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Speaking to the congress on 4 March, Le Duan confined his remarks to the problems of women and did not discuss current DRV economic policy--a subject stressed by the First Secretary in his address at the trade union congress as well as by Truong Chinh at the youth conference. Le Duan underscored the "positive participation" of women in the socialist revolution and noted the close link between women's liberation and national and class liberation. He contended that the "main content" of women's liberation was the fight against economic backwardness, the fight against "erroneous and backward" concepts about women, and the need for them to "join in the management of the society" and participate in production work in accordance with their capabilities. Echoing sentiments voiced by Premier Pham Van Dong at the third women's congress in 1961, Le Duan declared that "no revolution can be successful without the participation of women."

BIRTH CONTROL In addressing the women's congress, Le Duan made only a passing reference to the need for "family planning," although at the trade union congress he had called attention to the DRV's "too rapid" population increase and the "acute imbalance" this had caused in the economy. Those remarks were consistent with the concern about population growth emphasized by Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi in his government report to the National Assembly in early February.

The urgency of birth control reportedly had been stressed at a conference convened by the central commission for protection of mothers and children, which VNA on 16 February announced had been held "recently." According to VNA, the conference, which was attended by Premier Pham Van Dong, noted that "remarkable" progress had been made in birth control in 1973 and that its "widespread practice" is one of "the most important tasks in the protection of mothers." The report observed further that "birth rates must be made into concrete quotas in the state plans and in the plans of all services and localities so as to bring down the population growth rate to 2.3 percent by the end of 1975 and to 1.7 percent by the end of 1980."

(The DRV Council of Ministers has announced a "second general census of the population throughout the North on 1 April 1974." The last DRV census took place in March 1960.)

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BOUMEDIENE DRV VISIT COVERAGE REVEALS LITTLE SUBSTANCE

Hanoi media coverage of Algerian President Boumediene's "official visit" to the DRV 5 to 8 March, following his attendance at the Lahore second Islamic summit conference, reflected the largely ceremonial nature of the visit and dealt mostly in standard expressions of mutual solidarity and friendship.

The high-level Algerian Government delegation was met on arrival 5 March by Premier Pham Van Dong, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Chief of the VPA General Staff Van Tien Dung and later welcomed by President Ton Duc Thang and Truong Chinh, chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee. First Secretary Le Duan, although missing from the welcoming ceremonies, did attend a banquet given that same evening. The Algerians were treated to the usual round of talks, banquets, and sightseeing, hosted mainly by Pham Van Dong.

The joint communique on the 8th, the final day of the visit, did not reveal the substance of the talks but focused mostly on mutually self-congratulatory platitudes and routine condemnation of the U.S. "involvement" in South Vietnam and U.S. "imperialism" in the Middle East. The communique noted that Pham Van Dong accepted an invitation to visit Algeria at a date to be decided. Although Boumediene paid lip service to customary Algerian support for the PRG "as full member of the great family of the nonaligned countries," he did not demonstrate this support by actually visiting the "liberated zone" in South Vietnam, as was done by Cuban Premier Castro during his September 1973 DRV visit.

An airplane crash that marred the last day of the Algerians' visit received slight, albeit high-level attention, in Hanoi media. First revealed in a DRV government "obituary" transmitted by VNA the following day, the crash was reported to have involved a "number" of Vietnamese and Algerian "cadres." A message of condolence from Ton Duc Thang and Pham Van Dong to Boumediene described the plane as Vietnamese.

HANOI NOTES RETURN OF DEAD U.S. POW'S BRIEFLY, FACTUALLY

Hanoi media have accorded only brief, factual treatment to the DRV Government decision to return the remains of U.S. servicemen who died in North Vietnam. Monitored PRG media have completely ignored the event.

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Hanoi radio on 4 March broadcast a brief undated "communiqué" announcing that the DRV representative to the four-party Joint Military Commission in Saigon had informed the United States that it would be allowed to send representatives to Gia Lam Airfield on the 6th to receive the remains of U.S. military personnel "who died after capture in the DRV." An equally laconic report of the 6th transmitted by VNA noted that the remains of 12 U.S. servicemen had been received by the U.S. party and duly listed their names, ranks and military service numbers.

A radio report broadcast on the 10th followed the same format as the earlier communiqué in announcing that the same procedures would be followed on the 13th for receiving the remains of another 11 U.S. military personnel. The receiving ceremony was reported on the 13th by Hanoi radio and VNA, including name lists.

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KOREA

PYONGYANG INTENSIFIES ANTI-PAK CHONG-HUI INVECTIVE CAMPAIGN

Pyongyang's campaign vilifying South Korean President Pak Chong-hui has intensified by degrees since it resumed seven months ago--after a year-long hiatus--and in the past three weeks has reached a new level of stridency. The latest upturn may in part reflect an attempt to exploit the ROK's imposition of stringent emergency measures in January following widespread student disturbances.

Abuse of ROK President Pak by name in North Korean media had been reduced to only occasional references between July 1972 and August 1973, following the 4 July 1972 signing of a North-South statement on improving relations that stipulated mutual slander should stop. During this period Pyongyang generally used the term "the person in high authority" when referring critically to Pak. The sudden reappearance in Pyongyang media of several harsher, stock epithets for Pak on 3 August 1973--following the kidnaping in Japan of South Korean opposition leader Kim Tae-chung and his forcible return to Seoul--suggests that Pyongyang was ready to exploit any suitable event to attack Pak, following the failure of the North-South talks held from November 1972 until June 1973.

The basic epithet for the ROK leaders, "the Pak Chong-hui clique," again became standard in Pyongyang usage following the August 1973 Kim incident. Pyongyang has embellished this stereotyped label in many variants since then, ranging from "fascist hangman" and "unpardonable criminal" to "war maniac," such stronger terms of vilification usually not being attributed to North Korean officials but included in commentaries and reportage.

In one departure from his practice, Hong Ki-mon, chairman of the North Korean Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, issued a vitriolic statement on 22 February calling Pak's alleged kidnaping of Kim Tae-chung "a despicable treacherous act" by one "who has engaged in selling the country and betraying the nation," and added other similar epithets. On 28 February the director of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland, Ho Chong-suk, called Pak a "traitor" in a report at a formal function in Pyongyang. A 13 February KCNA report on the South Korean situation warned that the people would soon "cut the windpipe of the Pak Chong-hui fascist clique" and "bury the oppressors to the last one."

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This type of vilification was relatively common prior to the restraints clearly placed on Pyongyang media in July 1972 following the North-South agreement to negotiate. The resumption in August 1973 began with the less strident "Pak Chong-hui clique" formulation, and usage extended to variant modifiers such as "traitorous," "fascist," and "military" in October 1973 after student demonstrations broke out in Seoul. During this same period the word "clique" in the standard formulation was often replaced by "gangsters," "rogues," and "blackguards." In December, after Pyongyang unilaterally claimed the right to control ship travel to five islands near the North Korean coast that have been under the jurisdiction of the UN Command, the media resumed usage of the sharper epithet "traitor Pak Chong-hui." Finally, Pyongyang in January reinstituted regular use of another previously standard term, "the Pak Chong-hui puppet clique," which had been used only rarely since August 1973. This return to "normal" Pyongyang invective followed closely on the heels of the ROK imposition of emergency measures in January.

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USSR

ADVOCATE OF AUTOMATION NAMED DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF GOSPLAN

In the wake of Brezhnev's call at the December CPSU plenum for basic improvements in planning and management, Minsk gorkom First Secretary Nikolay N. Slyunkov, a promoter of plant automation, was named a deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan on 17 January. The appointment was revealed in a February issue of the COLLECTED DECREES OF THE USSR GOVERNMENT. In mid-January Slyunkov was released from the Minsk party post. Like other recent changes in the relatively stable Gosplan hierarchy, Slyunkov's appointment presumably reflects an attempt to make Gosplan more responsive to new policy priorities. The appointment of agricultural specialist Tikhon Sokolov as first deputy chairman of Gosplan in April 1970 coincided with revisions in the five-year plan in favor of increased investments in agriculture, just as the naming of foreign trade specialist Nikolay Inozemtsev as Gosplan deputy chairman in May 1973 coincided with increased stress on East-West trade.

Slyunkov may have ties with USSR First Deputy Premier Mazurov, since he became director of the Minsk spare parts plant in 1960 and director of the big Minsk tractor plant in 1965, during Mazurov's tenure as Belorussian first secretary. In 1966 Slyunkov, with the assistance of a Moscow institute, began developing methods for computerizing many of the tractor plant's operations. The experiment reportedly led to reduced production costs and increased managerial efficiency, and the plant's work was praised by a CPSU Central Committee decree in early 1972.

In a lengthy interview in the 1 November 1972 LITERARY GAZETTE, Slyunkov described the origins and advantages of the Minsk innovation and stressed the importance of computers in enabling his plant to sell tractors to foreign countries. The interview also disclosed that he had advocated computerization in a report to the State Committee on Science and Technology. In June 1972 he was promoted to first secretary of Minsk gorkom, and he was among those escorting Premier Kosygin on his visit to the Minsk tractor plant last November.

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EXPERIMENTS IN INTERFARM ORGANIZATION RECEIVE INCREASED PUBLICITY

Brezhnev's call at the December CPSU plenum for kolkhozes and sovkhozes to pool their resources and form large-scale, specialized complexes has prompted an upsurge of publicity for various new forms of interfarm organization as well as some related controversy.* The well-publicized Moldavian experiment with kolkhoz councils and interkolkhoz organizations has begun to share the spotlight with specialized intersovkhoz and kolkhoz-sovkhoz associations-- all of which meet the standards laid down by Brezhnev.

The formation of mixed kolkhoz-sovkhoz associations in Tambov Oblast has received much publicity in recent weeks. The Tambov experiment was described by a Tambov rayon economic administrator in the 3 December ECONOMIC GAZETTE, by a Tambov obkom secretary in the 11 February ECONOMIC GAZETTE, by the oblast executive committee first deputy chairman in the 21 February RURAL LIFE, and by officials connected with the experiment in the January and February issues of the journal ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE. Beginning in 1965 as an oblast interkolkhoz association for livestock fattening, the Tambov association proved to be so profitable that by 1972 virtually all the oblast's sovkhozes and kolkhozes had become shareholders in the association, and it was renamed a kolkhoz-sovkhoz association. The oblast association consists of specialized rayon associations managed by boards of directors elected by councils of kolkhoz chairmen and sovkhoz directors. In the press accounts of their activities, the specialized associations are reported to have created large livestock complexes which produce meat more efficiently than comparable livestock trusts under the RSFSR Ministry of Sovkhozes. The experiment has also been hailed as a means for overcoming the differences between the two forms of property in Soviet agriculture and for creating a single form of property.

In contrast, the RSFSR Ministry of Sovkhozes, set up to manage a separate system of specialized sovkhoz trusts and production associations, is promoting a reorganization of regional sovkhoz trusts into giant agricultural "firms" in which member farms surrender all rights and resources to their

* For background, see the TRENDS of 6 February 1974, pages 9-12.

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parent organizations and serve as subdivisions of the latter. Such specialized firms in agriculture are analogous to the industrial firms or production associations that originated in Leningrad, where the first vegetable-raising firm was also created in 1971.

To study the experience of the Leningrad vegetable firm and the 25 other such firms and associations in the Russian republic, the RSFSR Ministry of Sovkhozes recently held a conference in Leningrad, reported in the 1 March SOVIET RUSSIA. While noting that the sovkhozes in most firms "do not lose their independence and legal rights," most speakers at the conference stressed that this form of farm organization was "transitional" and that member sovkhozes will eventually become integral parts of firms having complete authority over their subdivisions. It was disclosed at the conference that one such firm, an association for poultry raising, was recently created in Voronezh and that its experience is being studied.

The report of the Leningrad conference noted disagreement over the new type of sovkhoz firm. The conferees were reportedly critical of those who regarded the firms as merely a loose form for administering individual sovkhozes rather than as a complete integration of member sovkhozes. At the same time, however, the latter alternative came under attack in an article in a February issue of the journal KOMMUNIST UKRAINY. The author of the article, I. I. Lukinov, condemned attempts to create giant farm organizations with subdivisions centrally administered and stripped of any legal rights and resources and insisted that such huge complexes are inherently unmanageable.

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NOTES

MOSCOW ON U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS: The U.S.-backed trade embargo of Cuba has come in for renewed criticism in the Soviet press, as Moscow continues to express indirect support for the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba. An article by Soviet political observer Matveyev in IZVESTIYA on 8 March professes to see signs that the U.S. policy is coming under increasing pressure both in Latin America and in the United States itself. He asserts that more than half the foreign ministers attending the 21-23 February Tlatelulco Conference opposed the blockade, and that the final document registered this opposition by endorsing the principles of equality between states, noninterference, and the right of each state to choose its own political, economic and social system. He went on to cite the Argentine-Cuban trade agreement and a Canadian request for export licenses on behalf of a Canada-based U.S. firm as examples of favorable movement in this regard, observing that the development of such trade favors the "relaxation of international tension." Both this commentary and other recent Moscow comment have drawn favorable attention to statements by U.S. public figures urging a change in U.S. policy.

PRC LANGUAGE REFORM: Peking has not allowed current concern over utilization of Western cultural forms to deter the movement toward reforming the Chinese written language through adoption of the Latin alphabet. NCNA on 12 March announced that Peking radio would broadcast 10 lectures on the Latinized alphabetization of Chinese characters from 15 March to 3 April. The lectures will be based on a textbook said to have been written last December. Revitalization of the movement to reform the Chinese written language, which languished during the cultural revolution, was signaled last spring when KWANGMING DAILY started publication of a column on the issue. An NCNA report last November specified that the reform process would be based on the Latin alphabet.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 4 - 10 MARCH 1974

<u>Moscow (2780 items)</u>	<u>Peking (1177 items)</u>
International Women's Day (--) 14%	Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius (8%) 11%
Arab-Israeli Issue (11%) 13% [Gromyko in Syria (7%) 9%] and Egypt	International Women's Day (--) 11% Algerian President Boumediene in PRC, DPRK, (20%) 8% and DRV
China (7%) 6%	Geneva Conference on Humanitarian Law (--) 6%
Chilean Solidarity Week (9%) 5%	Congratulations to Burmese (--) 4% Prime Minister Ne Win on Election
Pompidou in USSR (--) 2%	Indochina (4%) 3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.